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ALIENATION OF AFFECTION AND DEFAMATION:
SIMILAR INTERESTS -DISSIMILAR TREATMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
A N INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO NONINTERFERENCE in personal matters
and the preservation of the rights of society as a whole have been,
and are, concepts of primary importance in the development of any legal
system. When determining which direction to take on specific legal
questions these two interests may conflict and must be carefully con-
sidered by the decision-maker. When individual rights and the rights of
society conflict, the decision-maker has three choices. He may uphold
the rights and interests of society to the detriment of individual in-
terests. Conversely, he may choose to protect the rights of the in-
dividual over those of society. More often than not he will choose to find
a middle ground at which the rights of the individual and the interests
of society are both served.
The latter is clearly the better choice, yet it presents the greatest dif-
ficulty. Determining how much of one interest must be deferred to the
interest of the other often demands the wisdom of Solomon. Further
complicating the process is the consideration that very often the line
between individual rights and the best interest of society is served by
maintaining individual rights. Thus, when a decision must be made as to
what the law should be, balancing the two interests is a difficult and
precarious challenge which few would willingly accept.
Regrettably, this challenge has not been accepted in considering the
action for alienation of affection. After having made significant progress
in its development, the action has met with considerable resistance by
those advocating its total abolition. In the past half-century, "anti-heart-
balm" commentary, advocating such a fate, has demonstrated its in-
fluence on a majority of state legislatures. These legislatures have, in
turn, either quickly done away with the action or have slowly chipped
away at its existence.
The action for defamation of character has also recently passed
through a period of resistance. After having first placed severe limita-
tions on this action,' however, the United States Supreme Court has
moved away from an extreme view of limitation and toward a more
balanced approach to individual and societal interests.2 The result has
been to better serve the interests of the society, i.e., providing for the
free exchange of ideas, and thereby maintaining a measure of societal
stability.
' See Elder, The Supreme Court and Defamation: A Relaxation of Constitu-
tional Restraints, 44 Ky. BENCH & B. 38 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Elder].
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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The recent legal decision-making process of the Supreme Court in the
area of defamation raises the issue of why a balanced approach has not
been similarly applied to actions for alienation of affection. The
revelance of this issue is even more striking when we consider that, in
effect, these two actions serve to protect similar interests. Actions for
defamation are concerned with preserving the reputation of the in-
dividual in the eyes of society. Interference with the individual's rela-
tionship with third persons is the underlying injury. Actions for aliena-
tion of affection are concerned with preserving the reputation of the in-
dividual in the eyes of his or her spouse. As in the action for defamation,
interference with the individual's relationship with a third person is
also the underlying injury in alienation of affection cases.
This Note will discuss the historical development of these two actions
in an effort to determine why they have been accorded dissimilar treat-
ment, and whether such treatment is justified. Consideration will be
given to the individual and societal interests which each action serves.
The effect of changing social policies on these actions throughout
history will be examined. Finally, suggestions will be made concerning
the future treatment of the alienation of affection action.
II. ALIENATION OF AFFECTION -THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Origins and Development in England
Interference with marital rights has long been actionable in English
law. What has today developed into the action for alienation of affection
had its early origin in actions for abduction or enticement of one's wife,
for which a remedy was available by writs of ravishment or trespass
before the local lord.'
By the thirteenth century an action at common law was available.'
Statutes expressly permitting an action for the abduction of a man's
wife appeared during the reigns of Edward I and Richard II By the
fourteenth century actions based on the statutes of Westminster were
highly evident.'
An action was also available to the agrieved husband against one who
3 III W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (9th ed.
1783); H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 262
(1968); R. H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 109 (1974).
See Milsom, Tresspass From Henry III to Edward III, 74 L.Q. REV. 195, 211
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Milsom]. Prior to recognition of the "abduction" in-
jury, one who physically interfered with or "assaulted" a man's wife had to forfeit
his wergeled to his lord, but no remedy was statutorily available to the husband.
Id.
3 Edw. 1, c. 13; 13 Edw. I, c. 36; 6 Rich. II, st. I, c. 6.
See Milsom, supra note 4. The specific writ employed was de uxore abducta




took part in the "diversion" of his wife.' This action was maintained
under canon law. However, the remedy available in common law courts
minimized the use of the ecclesiastical action.8
The actual injury for which the husband brought suit was the loss of
"consortium." Consortium had been considered to consist of the total
services of the wife,' and the husband's interest in his wife's services
permitted an action for damages. This action, per quod consortium
amisit, would be instituted when another individual physically removed
or hurt the wife.1"
To be actionable the taking had to have been by persuasion, violence
or fraud.11 This was deemed to be an assault on the husband and not the
wife."2 The action brought for this assault was distinct from another ac-
tion whereby the husband could join the wife against the offender for
the actual physical assault on the wife. In the latter action, suit was
brought for the wife's injury as opposed to the injury to the husband. 3
In Guy v. Livesey,"' it was alleged that "the plaintiff's wife went with
the defendant and lived with him in a suspicious manner. "" The action
brought by the plaintiff was for the trespass of assault and battery, in
that the defendant "did assault, beat, and wound the plaintiff."'8
Because the defendant had also physically beaten the plaintiff's wife,
the defendant argued that the plaintiff should have had only one action,
that of the assault of the wife.17 The defendant argued that allowing the
See R. H. HELMHOLZ, supra note 3.
1 While the ecclesiastical courts offered return of the abducted spouse and
imposed penance on the offenders, money damages were not available. However,
money damages were available to the husband in common law courts. The of-
fenders would also be imprisoned and fined at the King's pleasure. It should be
noted that recovery of the abducted spouse was not an element of the common
law remedy. See III W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3; R. H. HELMHOLZ, supra note
3.
, The consortium right of the husband developed from the master's property
right in his servants. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 124
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]; H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 263.
See also Guy v. Livesey, Cro. Jac. 502, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1619); Note, The Suit of
Alienation of Affections: Can its Existence be Justified Today?, 56 N.D. L. REV.
239, 242 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Existence Justified?].
to A TREATISE OF FEME COVERTS: OR, THE LADY'S LAW 85 (1732).
1" W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3. The law presumed force and constraint, as a
woman could not give her consent to leaving her husband.
1" This "assault on the husband" approach to the injury may have developed
from the time of William the Conqueror. See note 4 supra.
'3 VIII W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 630 (1952).
Cro. Jac. 502, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1619).
15 Id.
" Id. (emphasis added).
" A woman in medieval England could not bring an action for trespass in her
own name. Such an action had to be brought by the woman's husband or father.
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plaintiff to recover for injury to him would not bar a second action by
the wife,"8 and thus defendant would be punished twice for the same
assault.
The court, in holding plaintiff's action to be properly brought, stated:
The action is not brought in respect of the harm done to the
wife, but is brought for the particular loss of the husband, for
that he lost the company of his wife, which is only a damage and
loss to himself, for which he shall have this action . *.. 29
In emphasizing the injury to the husband for the wrongful acts
perpetrated on the person of the wife, and by permitting the action to
be brought only by the husband, the courts underscored the broad social
policy equating a wife's consortium to a property right vested solely in
the husband." Viewing a wife as "property" was a well established social
principle of early English law"1 and in effect, if not in fact, the action for
per quod consortium amisit was brought for injury to the husband's pro-
perty. This "damaged goods" view of the action prevailed in the courts
until the eighteenth century.2 At that time the injury was extended to
cover the loss of the intangibles of marriage, love and affection.
The specific allegation of alienation of affection was first made in
Winsmore v. Greenback."' In Winsmore, the plaintiff's wife had left the
plaintiff and taken up residence with the defendant. When the wife
desired to reconcile with the plaintiff she was prevented from leaving
by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant maliciously
persuaded, procured and enticed the wife into staying, and caused her
to alienate her affections from the plaintiff. The defendant objected to
the lack of precedent for an alienation of affection action."
Lord Chief Justice Willes stated that while an action brought for
alleged alienation of affection had no precedent, the complaint was
The woman, however, would be joined in the action. See note 11 supra and accom-
panying text.
'8 See note 17 supra.
19 Cro. Jac. 502, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1619).
o See Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affection, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472
(1934) [hereinafter cited as Brown]; See generally Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich.
123, 50 N.W. 842 (1891); Crane v. Ketcham, 83 N.J.L. 327, 84 Atl. 1052 (1912).
21 See generally notes 2, 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, this view continued to prevail in the minds of ordinary
citizens and the legislatures of many states.
' See Existence Justified?, supra note 9. The original "property" view was
probably based on the duties the wife performed around the house, much like a
servant. Id. The change in attitude towards women has been gradual, reflecting
the slow change in the definition of consortium from property rights to intangible
marriage rights.
24 Willes 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745).




merely the allegation of a new fact"8 in the recognized action for per
quod consortium amisit.2 As such, the allegation was permitted to stand
and the action for "alienation of affections" was recognized. 8
Thus, in England, an early action for interference with marital rights
represented the right of the individual to maintain and protect his per-
sonal property. This individual interest was in accord with the interests
of a landed society. Property was the basic source of wealth in medieval
society" and, as such, protection of personal property was of utmost im-
portance to the maintenance of a stable society. This interest, coupled
with the societal interest of maintaining the King's peace and the
Church's interest in perserving the marital institution, carried over into
the eighteenth century and eventually found its way to America.
B. Further Development-America
Specific allegations of alienation of affection, first recognized in
England during the eighteenth century, took almost a century longer to
be transmitted to, and recognized as, an independent cause of action in
the United States. Prior to 1866, an action on the case, much like that of
the English common law, for "enticing away and harboring" a man's
wife was available to American husbands whose wives had been
physically removed from them." The necessary elements of this action
were that the defendant, acting from improper motives, induced or per-
suaded the plaintiff's wife to physically depart from the plaintiff, thus
depriving him of her consortium: Consortium was defined as assistance
and society.3
In 1866 the New York court in Heermance v. James 2 was faced with a
previously unconsidered fact that would ordinarily, under the esta-
blished action on the case for enticing away and harboring, prohibit an
"6 The action was brought on the case for enticing away and detaining the
plaintiff's wife. Among the facts, or counts, which the plaintiff plead were that
the defendant: 1) intended to injure the plaintiff's wife; 2) desired to deprive him
of her aid, assistance and comfort; 3) intended to promulgate argument and
discord between them; 4) sought to deprive the plaintiff of his wife's estate; and
5) desired to alienate the affections of the plaintiff's wife to him. Id.
' See Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890). The tort of aliena-
tion of affection is still not recognized, in its own right, in England. See Gottlieb
v. Gleiser, 1 Q.B. 267 [1958]; Existence Justified?, supra note 9, at 241.
M Of course, nothing truly new was recognized in Winsmore except the ter-
minology "alienation of affection." The action was still per quod consortium
amisit.
29 See generally H. PIRENNE, MEDIEVAL CITIES: THEIR ORIGINS AND THE
REVIVAL OF TRADE 42-43, 222 (1952).
' Turner v. Estes, 3 Mass. Rep. 317 (1807); Schuneman v. Palmer, 4 Barb. 225
(N.Y. 1848).
31 Id.
1 47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. 1866).
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aggrieved husband from bringing an action. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had intentionally alienated the affections of the plaintiffs
wife via persuasion, and the plaintiff had thereby lost the comfort, soc-
iety, aid, assistance and conjugal affection of marriage. The plaintiff's
wife had not been physically removed from the marital home, but was,
in fact, still living there. Therefore, the defendant argued, there was no
interference with the marital relationship for which the plaintiff could
have a cause of action.3
The court, in allowing the action to be maintained and sustaining the
lower court's judgment for the plaintiff-husband, recognized that the in-
jury for which the action had been brought was precisely the same as if
the parties had been physically separated." Noting that there had been
a "poisoning" of the wife's opinion of her husband, the court stated that
a remedy for this wrong should be available to the husband.'
Recognition by the court in Heermance v. James of the loss of an in-
tangible of marriage, such as affection and favorable opinion of one's
spouse toward the other, without the traditionally required physical
loss, suggests a strong departure from the social policy which con-
sidered wives to be their husband's chattel. The action was no longer
one for the loss of an individual's interest in personal property, but for
the loss of the affection and esteem of his spouse. "Consortium" had ap-
parently attained a new meaning. 3
It is from this point in time that alienation of affection as a mere
allegation of fact became an action in its own right.37 The elements of
the new action became established as: 1) the wrongful conduct of the
defendant with the plaintiff's wife;3' 2) the loss of affection and consor-
tium;39 and 3) a causal connection between the acts of the defendant and
3 Id.
' The court observed that the continuing physical presence of the wife, who
constantly rejected her husband, was in all probability of greater injury to the
husband than if the wife had been enticed away. Id. at 126.
8 See 47 Barb. at 125-26.
36 A necessary element of the husband-wife relationship must be some degree
of esteem between the parties. This esteem, or high regard, is lost when affection
is alienated. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 876.
' Not all courts were as quick to adopt the new action as was the New York
court. The Massachusetts court specifically refused to permit the action. See
Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N.E. 417 (1891). See also Crane v. Ketcham,
83 N.J.L. 327, 84 Atl. 1052 (1912).
' The action could, at this time, still only be brought by a husband for the
alienation of his wife's affection. See Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522
(1890).
" Because of the unequal development in and treatment by the various state
courts, "consortium" eventually came to include affection, society, companion-
ship, services, assistance, opinion, exclusive sexual relations and any other kind
of relations that normally arise between husband and wife in the traditional




the loss of consortium."0 The primary purpose of the action was to in-
hibit interference with familial relations and preserve the stability of
the home."1
Only one vestige of medieval social policy remained to be expunged
from the action for it to conform to modern social thinking. The action
could still only be brought by a husband for loss of his wife's consor-
tium." Actions brought by a wife for the loss of her husband's consor-
tium were denied for various reasons, including the historical considera-
tions of the wife as her husband's property and the human nature of all
males and females." A woman was considered to be "purer and better
by nature than her husband""" and, because of this, it was understood
that a wife assumed the risks of an unfaithful husband. In Duffies v.
Duffies" the court expounded upon this proposition by stating that a
husband is often
exposed to the temptations, enticements and allurements of the
world, which easily withdraw him from her society or cause him
to desert or abandon her .... The wife had reason to expect all
these things when she entered the marriage relation, and her
right to his society has all these conditions, and is not the same
in "degree and value" as his right to hers."
Once again some courts began to recognize the inequity and lack of
sound reasoning behind such a policy. 47 As women's legal rights ex-
panded into other "male" areas of law from which they had once been
precluded, 8 many state courts deemed it time to correct the feudal fic-
tion that baron and feme were one individual. 9 Increasing numbers of
and other terms in defining consortium. Thus, the alienation of affection action
came to mean slightly different things in different jurisdictions. See Holbrook,
The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1923). See also H.
CLARK, supra note 3. Accord, Brown, supra note 20.
4o See Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 129 (Iowa 1978). On occasion, a
forth element has been added: the existence of the marriage at the time of aliena-
tion. See Existence Justified?, supra note 9, at 243.
41 See Brown, supra note 20. See also Feisinger, Legislative Attack on Heart-
Balm, 33 MICH. L. REV. 979, 992 (1935) [hereinafter cited at Feisinger].
42 See notes 17, 38 supra.
,3 See Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890).
" Id. at 375, 45 N.W. at 525.
'" Id. at 374, 45 N.W. at 522.
"6 Id. at 375, 45 N.W. at 525.
"7 See Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891).
" See generally Existence Justified?, supra note 9, at 242-43.
,' See Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891); Bennett v. Bennett,
116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889). For an excellent account of the various
treatments accorded to the action by the states just after the turn of the century,
see King v. Hanson, 13 N.D. 85, 99 N.W. 1085 (1904).
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states followed this lead until virtually every state permitted the wife
to bring her own action for alienation of affection.'
As a result, the action's focus was shifted from the feudal property in-
terest of the individual to the individual's right to noninterference in his
or her marital relationship. This in turn had the beneficial effect on
society of protecting these relationships from outside interference. A
certain amount of stability reminiscent of the English interest in keep-
ing the King's peace was maintained.
C. Decline of the Cause of Action
During the 1930's, actions for alienation of affection and criminal con-
versation" came under strong attack. Objections were based on several
grounds, among which were: 1) unfounded actions and coercive set-
tlements; 2) increased blackmail and extortion activity; and 3) excessive
damages.2
Despite the advancements made in the action by extending it to
women and recognizing that "consortium" consisted of marriage in-
tangibles, advocates of abolishing the action revived the "property"
stigma of feudal law to proclaim a fourth objection. Their argument was
that because the action had its original basis in property law, it had
been made obsolete by women's emancipation statutes and could not ex-
ist in modern times.
53
1 See Comment, "Anti-Heart Balm" Legislation Revisited, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
538, 539 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Anti-Heart Balm].
51 Criminal conversation is the common law civil action for adultery. Some com-
mentators have stated that the two actions are alike in scope of injury and func-
tion. See Feisinger, supra note 41. While such a claim may be true in certain cir-
cumstances, the scope of injury in the alienation of affection action would appear
to be much broader than in criminal conversation. The scope of injury in criminal
conversation is loss of exclusive sexual relations only. See id. See also note 40
supra and accompanying text.
Adultery may be alleged in alienation of affection actions but is not required
to show injury to the plaintiff. Such a showing would only affect the amount of
damages awarded. See Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); W.
PROSSER, supra note 9, at 876-77.
52 The action was recognized by some courts as being convenient to those who
would either not bring an action against a person of high social standing in return
for some compensation, or would bring such an action in the hopes of deceiving a
judge or jury and recovering money damages. At the very least an unscrupulous
plaintiff could hope to embarrass the innocent defendant so as to gain an out of
court settlement. These schemes were highlighted by a willing press. See Miller
v. Levine, 130 Me. 153, 154 Atl. 179 (1931); McCollister v. McCollister, 126 Me.
318, 138 Atl. 472 (1927).
Damages awarded for the alienation of affection action were often considered
to be excessive and were often judicially reduced. Anti-Heart Balm, supra note
50, at 540 n.16.




The public was informed of these injustices by a highly receptive and
sensationalistic press. Newspaper accounts of alienation of affection
cases were often exaggerated. Many included elements of love, passion,
sex, scandal and excessive damages awarded by highly sympathetic and
outraged juries." Actions brought which were of significant value and
protected legitimate interests were ignored." The press' purpose could
only have been to increase its number of readers. 6
Due to highly visible and publicized "abuses" of these actions, which
became known at "heart-balm" actions, state legislatures began to enact
"anti-heart-balm" legislation. This legislation abolished the actions for
alienation of affection and criminal conversation. Indiana was the first
state to pass such a measure, with New York following the same year.
Twenty-three states have, to date, joined with Indiana and New York in
abolishing the action.' Five others have modified the action by making
rights would fail to realize the progress made in eliminating the feudal property
bias of the alienation of affection action. Just when the action had been equalized
between the sexes and a nonproperty injury had been recognized, these "pro-
gressives" deemed the action outdated. This would indicate the confusion which
existed at the time among these individuals, as to whether the action was a tort
to the person or one to property. See Comment, Legislative Abolition of Certain
Actions Designed to Protect the Family Relation, 30 ILL. L. REV. 764, 771-72
(1936) [hereinafter cited as Abolition Legislation].
" Id. at 772 n.57. The jury reaction in these cases may indicate the strong in-
terest of the general population in redressing the wrongs committed in actions
for alienation of affection.
Id. at 772.
See generally Anti-Heart Balm, supra note 50, at 538-40.
67 1935 IND. ACTS. c. 208; 1935 N.Y. LAWS c. 263. As indicative of the strength
with which the statutes passed, the Indiana Act passed the House by a vote of 87
to 7, and in the State Senate, 31 to 15. The New York Assembly vote was 146 to 6
and the Senate vote was 36 to 9.
In signing the New York law, then Governor Lehman stated:
The public is well acquainted with the many abuses that have arisen in
the prosecution or threats of prosecution of this type of action. For years
these actions have been used to extract large sums of money without
proper justification. They have been a fruitful source of coercion, extor-
tion and blackmail.
Abolition Legislation, supra note 53, at 773 n.59.
1 ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (Supp. 1979);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); CONN.
GEN STAT. ANN. § 52-572b (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West 1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-109.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 167 (Supp. 1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-301 (1974); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.01 (West 1980);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-1201 (1974); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1973); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1952); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1
(West Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.840 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001
19811
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it more difficult to maintain or by limiting recoverable damages. 59 Loui-
siana has judicially refused to recognize the action."
Today's opponents of the action cite the same arguments proposed
almost a half century ago. Warnings of possible abuse of the action by
spiteful spouses are voiced.' Similarly, adverse publicity, reminiscent of
blackmail and coercion claims, is also cited.2 Perhaps the only new argu-
ment presented is that the action fails to be of any benefit in a society
where free love and individual privacy are of utmost importance. 3
The current legislative attitude toward alienation of affection reflects
the presence of thinking influenced by the ideas of the 1930's. Present
attitudes are best summed up by the preamble to the Florida alienation
statute. After recalling the effects of the "grave abuses" attributed to
the action and the "unscrupulous persons" who have used the action to
their own gain, the legislature stated that it is in the best interest of the
people to completely abolish the action."'
Whether the abolition of the action best serves the interest of society
must be considered in light of legislative misunderstandings of the ac-
tion and its manipulation for political purposes. If society has been best
served, legislative choice of abolishing the action (clearly an extreme in
the legal decision-making process) surely is not in the best interest of
(Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-220 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2A (Supp. 1979); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 248.01 (West Supp. 1979); WYO. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977).
69 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1979) (one year statute of limitations); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 170 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (only recovery of actual damages per-
mitted); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 170 (Purdon 1965) (no action against strangers);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (Supp. 1978) (one year statute of limitations); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 28-305 (1956) (three year statute of limitations).
' Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927). The court stated that
marriage is a civil contract, and that no action is recognized in the Louisiana Civil
Code for damages against a third party who induces a party to the civil contract
to break that contract. Id.
61 See Existence Justified?, supra note 9, at 250-52.
62 Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254-55.
The preamble states:
Whereas, the remedies provided for by law for the enforcement of action
based upon alleged alienation of affections have been subjected to grave
abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarassment, humiliation and
pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of any
wrongdoing who are merely the victim [sic] of circumstances, and such
remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their un-
just enrichment and such remedies having furnished vehicles for the
commission or attempted commission of crime and in many cases have
resulted in the perpetration of frauds, exploitment and blackmail, it is
hereby declared as the public policy of the State of Florida that the best
interest of the people and of the state will be served by the abolition of
such remedies.




promoting an individual's right of noninterference with his marital rela-
tions. If both of these interests are to be served, a middle ground must
be struck, as evidenced by the development of the law of defamation.
III. DEFAMATION -THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Origins and Development in England
The action for defamation of character developed early on in the com-
mon law of England and evolved under changing social policy. The in-
terests it has protected have been shaped by the needs of societal
time periods and thereby have also been open to periodic criticism and
abuse. 5
The origin of the action has been traced to Germanic influences on
early English common law.6 The physical act of revenge for wrongs
gradually gave way to the payment of the wer as compensation for an
injury. 7 Other forms of punishment were decreed in the event that the
offender could not meet this monetary obligation. 8
Prior to the development of the King's common law courts, three
courts held jursidiction over defamation cases. Like the early actions for
abduction or enticement, almost every defamation action brought prior
to the thirteenth century was instituted in seignorial courts. The plain-
tiff claimed compensation for actual damage and also for the shame done
to him. 9 Actions brought in the seignorial courts apparently served to
satisfy the claims of the ordinary masses. 0
At the same time the ecclesiastical court also claimed jurisdiction
over defamation. Defamatory falsehoods were considered to be a sin.
The Church's jurisdiction extended over sexual morality, usury, perjury
65 See Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM.
L. REV. 546 (1903) [hereinafter cited as Veeder].
Id. at 548. Early libel law has been considered to have been based on
Roman law. Id. at 547.
67 Id. at 548. The amount of damages and form of payment were often dictated
by the degree of the insult. Id. at 548 n.3. Under the Lex Salica, if one called a
man a "wolf" or "hare" the fine was three shillings. On the other hand, falsely
calling a woman a "harlot" could cost the slanderer forty-five shillings. II F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 537 (1895).
King Alfred decreed that should a slanderer be unable to pay damages, he
would have his tongue cut out. Under the Norman Customal, one who falsely calls
another a "thief' or "manslayer" must pay damages and, holding his nose, publicly
confess to be a liar. See Veeder, supra note 65, at 548-49.
69 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 67. See II SELECT PLEAS IN
MANORIAL COURTS (Seldon Soc.) at 13, 56. The damage to reputation was even
evident in an action for the failure to repay a debt. See THE COURT BARON
(Seldon Soc.) at 47.
" See II SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL COURTS (Seldon Soc.) at 19, 36, 82, 95,
109, 116, 143, 170; THE COURT BARON (Seldon Soc.) at 48, 57, 61, 125, 133, 136.
Nobles could still resort to the duel. See Veeder, supra note 65, at 549.
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and defamation.71 The basis of its jurisdiction, as with interference with
marital rights, was the injuria.2 Punishment for defamation in the ec-
clesiastical courts usually consisted of mere acknowledgment of the
falsity of the statement and an apology to the person defamed."3
While early English statutory law provided specifically that actions
for defamation should be the sole province of the Church and that
money and damages could not be awarded,74 eventually money damages
and the seignorial courts were made available to the action. The
Church's control over the action was substantially weakened over time
until it was finally eliminated."5
A third jurisdiction available only to defamed individuals of the nobil-
ity was administered by the King's Council. The offense of De Scandalis
Magnatum, enacted by statute in 1275, provided for imprisonment of
anyone found to be slandering the King or the upper class.7 1 Punishment
was later made determinable by the Council7 which sat in what was to
become known as the "Star Chamber.7 8
De scandalis magnatum survived for more than 600 years. The social
purpose of the action was essentially to do away with dueling in order
to preserve the king's peace. Like the action for alienation of affection,
actions for defamation of character were statutorily enforceable in
order to avoid physical revenge. This, in effect, served to stabilize society.
In carrying out this purpose, however, the Star Chamber eventually ex-
71 Veeder, supra note 65, at 550.
72 Id.
7' A similar punishment for the action of "diversion" of one's wife was
available in these courts. The inability to procure money damages eventually led
both actions to be brought primarily in secular courts. See notes 7-8 supra and ac-
companying text. See also Veeder, supra note 65, at 551-52.
71 See 13 Edw. I, c. I.
71 See Veeder, supra note 65, at 552. Ecclesiastic jurisdiction was finally
abolished during the reign of Queen Victoria. 18 & 19 Vic. c. 41.
76 The statute provided:
Whereas much as there have been aforetimes found in the courts
devisers of tales ... whereby discord hath arisen between the King and
his people or great men of this realm ... it is commanded that none be so
hardy as to tell or publish any false news or tales whereby discord or oc-
casion of discord or slander may grow between the King and his people
or the great men of the realm; he that doth so shall be taken and kept in
prison until he hath brought him into the court which was first author of
the tale.
3 Edw. I, c. 34. "Great men of the realm" was defined as "Prelates, Dukes, Earls,
Barons.... Chancellor, Treasurer, Clerk of the Privy Seal, Steward of the King's
House, Justices ... and other great officers of this realm." 2 Rich. II, c. 5.
7 See 12 Rich. II, c. 11.
11 See Veeder, supra note 65, at 554.
79 The action was finally abolished in 1887. Statute Law Revision Act, 1887,




tended its criminal jurisdiction to nonpolitical defamation." Thus,
general defamation of a member of the nobility was susceptible to a
criminal trial before the Star Chamber, and as a result, the Star
Chamber developed an infamous reputation of infringing upon in-
dividual rights of free speech.8'
Beginning with the reign of Elizabeth I, the common law courts began
to extend their jurisdiction over the law of defamation. This was parti-
ally due to the slow demise of a landed society and the emergence of a
merchant class. Seignorial courts had also gradually declined. In addi-
tion, the reformation had so altered the social and political makeup of
English society that the Crown, in order to usurp the control of the
Church, had to absorb those areas of the law which had formerly been
the province of the ecclesiastical courts." Actions for defamation"
became so numerous that the common law courts quickly found methods
with which to dismiss the actions.84
Written defamation took still another path before hooking up with its
oral relative. With the development of the printing press in 1476, the
potential for a socio-cultural, and possibly political, revolution presented
itself. With this the Church began to realize the enormous threat to its
position should there be a free and unfettered press. Thus the Church
imposed controls."8
Serious treatment of political and nonpolitical defamation occurred
when the legal power of the Church passed to the Crown. Censorship
was continued and strengthened." Eventually the jurisdiction for writ-
ten defamation passed to the Star Chamber which decided that harsh
Roman criminal law, rather than canon law, should be adopted as the
basis for implementing punishment for the violation of the Crown's cen-
sorship laws. 7 The interests of society and the individual's interests in
reputation were given extreme preference over the individual right of
free speech.
In time the Star Chamber lost its power and some balance was struck
between the conflicting interests. The division between written and
0 See Veeder, supra note 65, at 555. See generally SELECT CASES IN THE
STAR CHAMBER (Seldon Soc.) at 20, 38, 39-41, 101, 104, 109, 163, 166, 182, 244, 245,
261.
81 See generally Veeder, supra note 65.
82 Id. at 555-58.
8 Defamation, at this point in time, consisted only of oral defamation. Id.
' See Veeder, supra note 65, at 558-60.
Id. at 558-62.
Under Elizabeth I, penalties for failing to comply with the censorship provi-
sions could have resulted in mutilation and death. Id. at 562.
" Id. at 562-69. Roman law distinguished defamatory falsehoods on the basis
of their form. Specific provisions for libellos famosis were available for the use,
and abuse, of the Star Chamber.
1981]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
spoken defamation, libel and slander respectively, had become clearly
defined." Thus a defamatory falsehood, when spoken, could very well
have caused little or no repercussion because of a common law
ancestry," thereby realizing some degree of free speech. But the same
remark, when written, evidenced greater malice. Such a remark, when
written, evidenced greater extent of publication, thereby causing even
greater harm to the defamed individual. Written defamation continued
to be closely monitored.
The purpose of the Crown in prosecuting defamatory remarks and
preserving reputations appears to have been two-fold. First, the Crown
desired stability in the realm. By permitting an action to be maintained
for defamation of the Crown, the Crown intended to secure its author-
ity. Second, the individual rights to noninterference between the rela-
tionship of the defamed individual and the rest of society was preserv-
ed. This right of action had also been available to commoners. As in the
action for alienation of affections, balancing the interests of society and
the individual was of utmost importance to the stability of society.
B. America-Prior to 1964
The importance of protecting one's reputation has been well recogn-
ized in American courts,9 and the common law action for defamation
was essentially preserved in America prior to 1964. Publication of
falsehoods which could cause "public hatred, shame, obloquy ...con-
tempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace" were ac-
tionable. 2 The three distinguishing characteristics of defamation were
still strict liability, presumption of damages and the limited availability
" See Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Developments -Defamation].
" Penalties for common law oral defamation were, by comparison to the
criminal penalties of the Star Chamber, relatively mild. See generally note 67
supra and accompanying text.
" See King v. Lake, Hardres 470 (1670). See also Ingber, Defamation" A Con-
flict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REv. 785, 797 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Ingber].
Lord Mansfield recognized the injustice of different standards for slander and
libel, but followed the historical treatment as handed down. See Thorley v. Lord
Kerry, 4 Taunton 355 (1812).
The basis for distinguishing the two forms of defamation has long been
debated, and will not be examined here. For a brief commentary on this subject,
see Veeder, supra note 65, at 571-73.
"' See Ingber, supra note 90, at 796; Developments-Defamation, supra note
88.
92 Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E.
217, 218 (1933). The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement merely




of defenses." To bring an action the plaintiff had only to place the state-
ment in evidence and prove that the defendant was responsible for ut-
tering or publishing the statement to others."'
The strict liability aspect was indicative of a continued recognition by
the courts that innocent defamation could cause as much harm as inten-
tional defamation. 5 The presumption of damages was founded on the
premise that the plaintiff might not be able to prove actual damage due
to the illusive nature of reputation." General damages were available to
the plaintiff."' Upon a showing of malice, punitive damages were also
allowed .
Due to the intangible nature of the injury, i:e., damage to esteem,
damages awards made by juries were highly speculative." Emotionally
charged juries resulted in a large range of possible awards. Verdicts
ranged from a few cents to several thousand dollars."'9
Under the common law a defendant had two major defenses: truth
and privilege. Originally under the common law, "truth" meant literal
truth. However, the harshness of this definition lead American courts
and some legislatures to require only substantial truth."' The second
major defense, "privilege," was easily susceptible to abuse. Absolute
privilege was limited to governmental acts, the purpose being to permit
officials the freedom to exercise their duties without fear of possible
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938).
"' See Ingber, supra note 90, at 797.
", See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., and Beyond. An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, at 1353
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Eaton]; Ingber, supra note 90, at 797-98.
' See Eaton, supra note 94.
See Ingber, supra note 90, at 799.
9, Id. Intangible damage consisted of the damage to reputation that is the
lowering of one's esteem in the eyes of others. Id See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.2, at 513-54 (1973).
9, See Ingber, supra note 90, at 799. Prior to 1825, malice, in the sense of ill
will or spite, was an essential element of the action. In Bromage v. Prosser, 107
Eng. Rep. 1051 [K. B. 18251, the court stated that malice would be implied from
the utterance of the defamatory statement unless it was prima facie excusable.
Thereafter "malice" became a mere formality and was no longer an essential ele-
ment of a plaintiffs case. However, it may have been essential when attempting
to overcome one of the various exceptions raised as a defense to strict liability.
See Eaton, supra note 94, at 1353.
" See Ingber, supra note 90, at 799. Ingber comments that the amount of
damages that a plaintiff might recover in a libel suit was more speculative than
in any other field of law. Id.
10 See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 761; Ingber, supra note 90, at 799.
101 Ingber, supra note 90, at 800.
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lawsuits."2 However, absolute privilege prohibited actions against of-
ficials despite the fact that the defendant's only purpose was to injure
the plaintiff."3
This privilege was also available for defamatory falsehoods made in
connection with official proceedings.' It was assumed that judicial sanc-
tions for contempt and perjury would be sufficient to penalize those who
made such remarks.0 0 This privilege was also extended to administra-
tive proceedings and legislative hearings."'
Qualified privileges existed for defendants who made publication in
order to fulfill a public or private duty to speak.01 The duty to speak
had to have been based on legal or moral grounds.' Generally, the
speaker could not communicate to a larger audience than was necessary
to serve his social purpose. He must also have had reasonable grounds
of belief in the truth of what he had said. Finally, he must not have been
acting out of improper motives."2 A plaintiff could overcome a defend-
ant's qualified privilege by a showing of malice."'
The interest being protected by the common law action was the in-
dividual's right to determine his relationship with society. Interference
with that relationship, by diminishing the individual's esteem, was ac-
tionable to order to protect this individual right.
This right was often protected, however, at the expense of the free
exchange of ideas. As noted, strict liability for defamation, absent a
privilege, placed severe limitations on free speech."' In effect, the
balance between the individual and societal interest in protecting in-
dividual relationships with third persons and the interest in preserving
free speech had been tipped heavily in favor of the former interest.
With this imbalance in mind, the Supreme Court proceeded to tip the
102 See Ingber, supra note 90, at 800; Developments-Defamation, supra note
88, at 918.
".. Developments-Defamation, supra note 88, at 917-20.
"4 Id. at 920.
"4 Id. at 921-22. However, it would appear that these sanctions were often not
utilized. Consider Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951), where the
defamatory remarks were made within objections to plaintiffs petition for ap-
pointment as amicus curiae in a previous action. The court considered the remark
absolutely privileged. Id.
A court would often consider the remark in relation to the proceeding to
determine if it was privileged. See Kinter v. Kinter, 84 Ohio App. 399, 87 N.E.2d
379 (9th Dist. 1949).
"4 See Developments-Defamation, supra note 88, at 921-22.
'o See Ingber, supra note 90, at 801.
108 Id.
109 See Developments-Defamation, supra note 88, at 929.
110 Id. at 930. For an in-depth discussion of common law privileges and
defenses to defamation actions, see id. at 917-33; Eaton, supra note 94, at 1360-63.




scale in the opposite direction by severely limiting the action, only later
to balance the conflicting interests involved.
C. Constitutional Restraints (1964-74)
From 1964 to 1974, the United States Supreme Court entered into the
development of the law of defamation by considering the effects of the
first amendment upon that law. "' Prior to 1964, the Court firmly re-
jected suggestions that the Constitution required the common law ac-
tion be modified or abridged. Such a suggestion prompted Mr. Justice
Frankfurter to state that "nowhere was there [in the first decades after
adoption of the Constitution) any suggestion that the crime of libel be
abolished."'1 3 In 1964, however, the Court decided to reconsider its posi-
tion on defamation in light of some of the action's more potentially
abusive elements."' In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"5 the Court
found that the "fair comment rule," employed by a majority of states,
violated first amendment guarantees."'
112 Prior to 1964, infusion of the first amendment into the law of defamation by
the Supreme Court was extremely limited. In 1925 the Court first suggested that
the first amendment applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). A definite holding to that effect
did not occur until 1931. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
Defamatory statements still were not considered protected by the first amend-
ment. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Court, in 1942, stated:
(T]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention of which have never been thought to raise any constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd, the obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting, or "fighting" words .... It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth, that any
benefit that may be derived from then is clearly out-weighed by the
social interest in order and morality.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
11 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1951). For the proposition that
punishment for libel does not violate the first amendment, see Washington Post
Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290 (1919); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904);
Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1876). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
482-83 (1957); Schnectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
But see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
"I See generally notes 93-110 supra and accompanying text.
115 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Dean Prosser considered this case to be "the greatest
victory won by defendants in the modern history of the law of torts." W. PROS-
SER, supra note 9, at 819.
11 The "fair comment rule" was privilege applied to matters of public interest.
The majority of states extended the privilege to "fair" expression of opinion and
not to misstatements of fact. The theory behind the rule was that misstatements
of fact were more damaging to reputations of public persons than were expres-
sions of opinion. It was also believed that fair opinion served a useful public pur-
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In the New York Times case, the Court was faced with inaccurate
facts published by the New York Times in a paid advertisement sup-
plied by a group of civil rights advocates."7 The plaintiff, a Montgomery,
Alabama city commissioner, had not been named or referred to in the
advertisement, but claimed to have been defamed in his capacity as
supervisor of the police department by two of the factual errors which
concerned police activity."8 The primary issue at trial was the truth of
the advertisement's allegations, as Alabama's fair comment rule pro-
vided protection for opinions based on the truth of the facts underlying
the statements made."9 Alabama law did not privilege good faith
misstatements of fact in discussion of public issues."2 The jury found for
the plaintiff and awarded damages of $500,000, which the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed."1
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the defense
of truth, by itself, was inadequate to protect the first amendment right
of freedom of expression. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
stated that in order for a public official to bring a defamation action he
must prove that the defamatory statement was made with "actual
malice," that is, "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.""
pose in the dissemination of ideas, while defamatory misstatements of fact im-
paired the public's ability to obtain accurate information. See Gutman, The At-
tempt to Develop an Appropriate Standard of Liability for the Defamation of
Public and Private People: The Supreme Court and the Federalization of Libel
Law, 10 N.C. CEN. L.J. 201, 204-05 (1979); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers
and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875 (1949); Veeder, Freedom of Public Discus-
sion, 23 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1910); Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207
(1949). See also Eaton, supra note 94, at 1362-63.
'.. The group called themselves the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South." 376 U.S. 254, 257. The inac-
curacies contained within the advertisement were relatively minor. The adver-
tisement stated that: 1) Negro students demonstrating outside the Alabama
State Capital sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee," but the demonstrators actually
sang the National Anthem; 2) nine students were expelled by the State Board of
Education for leading the demonstration, whereas they had been expelled for
demanding lunch service at the county courthouse; 3) the entire student body had
protested, where only most of the students had; 4) the dining hall had been lock-
ed, when it had not; 5) police were deployed "ringing" the campus, when they had
only been deployed near the campus; and 6) Dr. King had been arrested seven
times and assaulted by police, where he had only been arrested four times and
the issue of assault was disputed. Id. at 258-59.
... Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the misstatements concerning deploy-
ment of the police in response to demonstrations and the number of arrests of Dr.
King and the alleged assaults on his person. Id. at 258.
Id. at 267.
"' See Eaton, supra note 94, at 1365.
376 U.S. at 256.




The Court's purpose in modifying the common law action was to
reduce interference with the free communication of ideas and opinions
concerning government and public officials. The Court recognized a "na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."'23 Social interest in the free communication of ideas
and opinions on issues concerning public officials was now to take prece-
dent over the rights of a defamed public official.1"'
Shortly thereafter the Court extended the actual malice requirement
to cover "public figures," thereby placing a further limitation on the
common law action. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts"2 5 (and its compan-
ion case, Associated Press v. Walker), five members of the Court agreed
that the actual malice limitations should cover all public persons, con-
sisting of public officials and public figures. 2' It was reasoned that all
public persons had sufficient access to means with which to rebut
defamatory falsehoods, and that by voluntarily thrusting themselves in-
to public life, these persons had assumed the risk of being defamed."2
against "public officials" was adapted by the Court from Coleman v. MacLennan,
78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). In that case the plaintiff, the Attorney General of
Kansas and a candidate for re-election, brought an action against a newspaper
publisher for alleged defamatory statements made concerning the plaintiff's of-
ficial conduct. The trial judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff had to show
actual malice; otherwise, the publication was privileged. The jury found that the
plaintiff had failed to carry this burden.
On appeal the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, noting the social importance of
being able to freely discuss candidates for office. The court extended the
privilege to "a great variety of subjects .... [which] includes matters of public
concern, public men, and candidates for office." 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P. 281, 285
(1908).
12 376 U.S. at 270. In their concurring opinions, Justices Black, Douglas and
Goldberg advocated absolute immunity in these actions. Id. at 293-305.
12 See Ingber, supra note 90, at 803.
12 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
2 Mr. Justice Harlan was joined by Justices Clark, Stewart and Fortas. Chief
Justice Warren (concurring in result only), joined by Justices Brennan and White
(concurring in Walker, dissenting in Butts), concurred in the extension to public
figures, but would have adhered to the New York Times standard. 388 U.S. at
162-170. Specifically, objection was made to Justice Harlan's evidentiary require-
ment of a "showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155, 163.
Justices Black and Douglas repeated their position in New York Times that
the media was absolutely immune from defamation liability under the first
amendment. Id. at 170-72.
'7 Id. at 154-55, 162. The plaintiff in Butts, the athletic director at the Uni-
versity of Georgia, had been accused in the Saturday Evening Post of conspir-
ing to fix a football game between Georgia and the University of Alabama by giv-
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In so reasoning the Court noted that freedom of speech went beyond
political and governmental issues and "embraced all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period."' 8 Thus, the logical exten-
sion of the limitation placed on common law defamation in Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc." should have come as no surprise.
The Court in Rosenbloom chose to focus on the nature of the subject
matter which the alleged defamatory statements discussed rather than
the status of the plaintiff or his degree of access to the media.'30 Here,
the New York Times malice test was extended to cover any statement
relevant to an issue of public interest' and, in effect, this approach
precluded almost any defamation action from being brought against the
press.3 ' A private individual, involuntarily linked to matters of general
interest, had no legal recourse against a defamatory falsehood unless he
could satisfy the New York Times test.'
The limitations imposed upon actions for defamation by the infusion
of first amendment rights, and the interpretation of those rights by the
Supreme Court beginning in New York Times and ending with
Rosenbloom, severely altered the action of defamation as it was known
ing away Georgia's plays and formations to the Alabama coach. Id. at 136. In
Walker, the plaintiff was a retired army general who had commanded federal
troops during a school desegregation confrontation in 1957. In private life he had
been actively engaged in politics and had actively opposed federal intervention in
school desegregation. An Associated Press dispatch had stated that Walker had
taken command of a violent crowd and had personally led a charge against
federal marshals who had been sent out to enforce court ordered desegregation.
Id. at 140-42.
Both Butts and Walker had originally been awarded tremendous damages.
Butts received $460,000 including punitive damages, and Walker had received
$500,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 138, 141-42.
" 388 U.S. at 147, citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
' See Elder, supra note 1; Ingber, supra note 90, at 807. In Rosenbloom, the
plaintiff was arrested on criminal obscenity charges for distributing "nudist
magazines." The trial judge found, as a matter of law, that his material was
.obscene. The defendant radio station had reported that upon plaintiffs arrest the
police had confiscated 3,000 obscene books. Later the station described the plain-
tiff as a "girlie-book-peddler" who was engaged in "the smut literature racket."
The district court held that the New York Times test was not applicable; the jury
awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in general damages and $725,000 in punitive
damages. The punitive award was reduced by the court to $250,000. On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed the decision. Id at 32-35.
's' See Ingber, supra note 90, at 807.
"' The opinion by Justice Brennan was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun only. However, the position of Justices Black and Douglas in New York
Times and Butts would appear to support the holding. See Elder, supra note 1, at
38.
"' See Justice Powell's comments on Rosenbloom in Gertz v. Robert Welch,




in the common law. The injury to a defamed individual was still
recognized. The effect of a defamatory falsehood would still disgrace
and lower an individual's esteem in the eyes of third persons. But free
expression was now considered to be of much greater importance than
the injury to the individual. The Supreme Court's trend since 1964 had
so altered the common law action that the potential to virtually
eradicate the action existed." However, perhaps in recognizing such
potential and due to the fact that severe limitations placed on the action
could allow one individual to freely injure another, the Court sensed
that it had gone too far."3 5
D. Relaxing Constitutional Restraints-
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 3 the petitioner, an attorney, had been
retained by the family of a young boy who had been shot and killed by a
Chicago policeman named Nuccio, to represent the family in civil pro-
ceedings against Nuccio. 37 In this capacity, the plaintiff attended the
coroner's inquest into the boy's death and brought an action for civil
damages.
The respondent published American Opinion, the monthly publication
and voice of the John Birch Society. As part of a continuing effort to in-
form the public of a "nationwide conspiracy to discredit local law en-
forcement agencies and create in their stead a national police force
capable of supporting a communist dictatorship,"'" an article was com-
missioned on Nuccio's murder trial. In March of 1969, the respondent
published an article entitled, "Frame-Up: Richard Nuccio and the War
on Police."1 9
The article attempted to show that false testimony against Nuccio
was given at his trial and that his prosecution was part of a Communist
plan. The article portrayed the petitioner as one of the masterminds
behind this plot. It stated that the petitioner: 1) had a lengthy police
record; 2) had been an official of a Communist organization which ad-
vocated the violent overthrow of the United States government; 3) was
a Communist; and 4) was a member of the National Lawyers Guild,
described as the organization which masterminded the Chicago riots at
the 1968 Democratic National Convention."'
"I Id. at 341-46.
135 Id.
13 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
17 The state had prosecuted Nuccio for homicide and eventually obtained a
conviction for second degree murder. Id. at 325.
138 Id.
1 Id. at 325-26.
140 Id. at 326. Specifically, the article stated that the petitioner's police file was
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All of the accusations in the article were false,"' and the managing
editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify or substantiate the
allegations. In fact, under a photograph of the petitioner he wrote the
caption, "Elmer Gertz of Red Guild harasses Nuccio."'' The magazine
was placed on sale across the county and reprints of the article were
handed out on the streets of Chicago.' 3
Petitioner filed a diversity suit for libel in federal district court. The
respondent filed a motion for summary judgment claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against defamation liability. Respondent relied on New
York Times, Butts, and Rosenbloom, stating that the petitioner was
either a public official or public figure and that the article concerned an
issue of public interest.'
The district court denied the respondent's motion, believing that at
trial the petitioner could factually show "actual malice."'' 5 After admis-
sion of all the evidence, but before submitting the case to the jury, the
court ruled that the petitioner was not a public figure or public
official.' 6 The jury returned with a verdict for the petitioner awarding
him $50,000."'
Subsequently, the district court reconsidered its earlier position and,
deciding that this was an issue of public concern, stated that the peti-
tioner had failed to show "actual malice," which was necessary to over-
come an application of Rosenbloom.'48 The court entered a judgment for
the respondent notwithstanding the verdict."9
The court of appeals affirmed the decision, noting that the article con-
so large that it took "a big, Irish cop to lift," the petitioner had been an official of
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy," originally known as the Intercol-
legiate Socialist Society, which has advocated "violent seizure of our govern-
ment," the petitioner was a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter," and the peti-
tioner was a member of the National Lawyers Guild described as a Communist
organization that "probably did more than any other outfit to plan the Com-
munist attack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention." Id.
" The petitioner had been a member and officer of the National Lawyers
Guild fifteen years earlier. Id.
"42 Id. at 327.
143 Id.
144 Id.
14' Id. The District Court evidently rejected the Rosenbloom argument that a
privilege existed by way of a public issue. Id.
146 Id.
'4 Id. at 329.
'" 322 F. Supp. 997 (1970). The District Court had anticipated the Supreme
Court's holding in Rosenbloom. 418 U.S. at 323-24.
"' "Having already concluded that there was not sufficient evidence presented
at trial to support a finding of actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth,
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be entered for the defendant." 322




cerned issues of public interest.' The court relied on the intervening
decision of the Supreme Court in Rosenbloom to require that the New
York Times test be applied to any publication of an issue of public in-
terest without regard to the status of the person defamed."' Because
the petitioner had failed to meet the New York Times requirement of
showing "actual malice," the respondent was privileged in his
remarks. 52
On review of its self-imposed constitutional restraints on defamation,
the Supreme Court recognized two important points. First, in an effort
to alleviate the inequities of the common law, it had placed limitations
on the action which permitted defamatory acts to go unchecked. 15 3 Se-
cond, the Court specifically recognized that the common law action for
defamation of a private individual was of substantial importance. 15 4
Speaking through Mr. Justice Powell, the Court noted that "there is
no constitutional value in false statement of fact. Neither the intentional
lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues.' ",155 Further,
the Court stated that "[t]he legitimate state interest underlying the law
of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them
by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to
abandon this purpose .... ,156
The Court also noted that a second societal value was at stake. 157 Ac-
cording to the Court, erroneous statement of fact is inevitable in a free
471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972).
's' 418 U.S. at 330-31. This is substantially the result of Rosenbloom. See note
123 supra and accompanying text. Judge John Paul Stevens stated that:
[W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never-
theless, under the reasoning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, even a
false statement of fact made in support of a false thesis is protected
unless made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of
its truth or falsity.
471 F.2d at 806.
152 471 F.2d at 806-07.
1" See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
4 See 418 U.S. at 340-42, 344-48.
1'5 Id. at 340. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
" See 418 U.S. 340, at 341. Justice Powell recalled Mr. Justice Stewart's ad-
monition in Rosenblatt v. Baer, that an individual's right to protect his reputation
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system
of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality . . . is left
primarily to the individual states .... But this does not mean that the
right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basis of our
constitutional system.
Id. at 341 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"' Both defamation actions and first amendment protections were implicitly
recognized as being of value to society. Id.
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society and punishing all errors could have a restrictive effect on con-
stitutionally guaranteed free speech and press;158 however, to allow un-
conditional immunity from defamation liability'59 "requires a total
sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation."1 0
Clearly a balance between the two competing values had to be
struck. 6 ' The Court first considered Mr. Justice Harlan's formulation in
Rosenbloom that these values be balanced on a case-by-case basis."2
This was rejected as being unpredictible, uncertain, and a burden on the
Court. 3
The Court then considered and accepted a compromise position
somewhere between New York Times, Butts and Rosenbloom. The
Court first recognized that the first defense of a defamed individual was
that of "self-help," that is, using every means at his disposal to rebut the
false statement and minimize the impact on his or her reputation. While
public officials and public figures had significant access to those chan-
nels of communication which could effectively permit them to ac-
complish this defense, ordinary individuals did not. Further, the media
was entitled to assume that public figures and officials had voluntarily
accepted the risk of being defamed by entering into the public eye.'
The private individuals had not thrust their good names into the public
eye, and therefore they "are not only more vulnerable to injury than
public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of
recovery."15
The Court therefore struck down the Rosenbloom limitation and
substantially retained the New York Times standard. But in placing
defamation back in the hands of the states, the Court could not permit
the common law inequity of strict liability to be resumed. Noting that
such a doctrine runs counter to the New York Times test, and that it
Id. at 340-41.
1 This was advocated by Justices Black and Douglas. See note 126 supra and
accompanying text.
418 U.S. at 341.
561 Id. at 343.
162 Once the evident need to balance the values underlying each is per-
ceived, it might be seen purely as an abstract matter, that the most
utilitarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every jury verdict
in every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the final judgment
leaves fully protected whatever First Amendment values transcend the
legitimate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who
prevailed.
403 U.S. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
' 418 U.S. at 343.
Id. at 344-45. The public's eye extends to all aspects of a public figure or of-
ficial's life, including personal activities. Id. See note 127 supra and accompanying
text.




would be highly unreasonable to one who takes all possible precautions
but still commits the error, the Court held that the states could not im-
pose strict liability. 6 ' In its place, the Court stated that the states had
free latitude with ,which to define for themselves the appropriate stan-
dard of liability in the case of defamation statements injuring private in-
dividuals."'7
Another inequity of the common law, singled out by the Court, was
the amount of damages recoverable by a defamed individual. The doc-
trine of presumed damages'68 and punitive damages appeared to the
Court to be amenable to potential abuse and become a further hindrance
to first amendment principles." Therefore, the Court held that plain-
tiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth, under New York Times, would be limited to compensation for ac-
tual injury. "' While the Court had modified the common law, the action
retained a substantial amount of its original characteristics. Yet the
Court had highlighted and diminished the more grave problems of the
common law action while leaving the rest intact.'
In the time since Gertz, the Supreme Court has had several oppor-
tunities to elucidate its position. In each instance the result has been to
further define the flexibility of the states in delineating the boundaries
of the action, and to emphasize protection of an individual's
reputation. " 2 Society's interest in eliminating the interference of one in-
Id. at 346-47.
167 The Court found this to be an equitable balance between the two conflicting
concerns: the state's legitimate interest in protecting private individuals, and
protecting the media from strict liability. Id. at 347-48. See Elder, supra note 1,
at 38.
'" Under the common law, the plaintiff was presumed to have been injured
solely by the publication of the defamatory falsehood. This was most likely based
on a broader presumption that publication would have a detrimental effect on the
plaintiffs reputation under every circumstance.
"" 418 U.S. at 349-50. The Court feared the subduing effect the threat of strict
liability would have on the free exchange of opinion, the possible use of this
measure to punish unpopular opinions and the unpredictability of a jury in award-
ing punitive damages. See note 168 supra and accompanying text.
10 418 U.S. at 349-50. But the Court loosely defined actual injury to include
"impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 350. While all awards require the sup-
port of competent evidence, no evidence which assigns an actual dollar amount to
the injury need be submitted. Id.
This may have actually returned the common law strict liability to the action.
See Ingber, supra note 90, at 810.
171 Ingber, supra note 90, at 811-58. Most states have adopted some form of
negligence test. See Collins and Drushal, The Reaction of the State Courts to
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 306 (1978).
' See Elder, supra note 1; Gutman, supra note 116, at 218-22. In Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court considered the plaintiff to be a private
19811
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
dividual in the relations of another with his peers would appear to have
the support of the Supreme Court as well as the common law. At the
same time the Court has retained protections for society's interest in a
free press and free speech by eliminating the strict liability standard
and placing a greater burden of proof on the plaintiff who desires more
than compensatory damages. 1"
IV. ALIENATION OF AFFECTION AND DEFAMATION-
PROTECTING THE SAME INTERESTS
The historical and developmental similarities of the action for aliena-
tion of affection and defamation of character are substantial. This is im-
portant when considering the present status of each. While differences
between the actions exist, it is questionable whether these differences
are so great as to justify according different treatment to each cause of
action.
Historically, both actions have served the same societal purposes and
have essentially protected the same individual rights. Each action
developed, in the common law, as a hedge against violating the stability
of society. Both actions represented the occurrence of a tort which
would produce high emotions and which ran the risks of personal
vengeance. In order to avoid acts of physical violence, these incidents
became actionable in the courts. This development demonstrated a very
real societal belief that protecting the individual's marital and social
rights served the best interests of society. The common and canon law,
both reflecting society's interests, recognized that substantial wrongs
were committed under both sets of circumstances and that the wronged
individual in each should have the opportunity to remedy these wrongs.
As each action developed, each was modified to reflect the special in-
person. Mrs. Firestone was married to an heir of the Firestone fortune and had
been involved in a lengthy and complicated divorce. She had held numerous press
conferences concerning her pending divorce and the Florida Supreme Court had
deemed the divorce a "cause celebre." Yet the Court stated that she had not
assumed "any role of special prominence in the affairs of society, other than
perhaps Palm Beach society," and had not "thrust herself to the forefront of any
particular public controversy." Id. at 453.
The Court also refused to equate "public controversy" with "all controversies
of interest to the public." Id. at 454. In so doing the Court placed a qualitative
limitation on the types of activities in which a public figure would participate.
See Elder, supra note 1, at 39.
In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Court held that an admitted
public figure could invade the editorial process and inquire into the state of mind
of the defendant in order to prove "actual malice." See also Wolston v. Readers
Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (individual convicted of contempt in
grand jury investigation concerning espionage activity in the United States not a
public figure); Hutchinson v. Proximire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (recipient of federal
grant with media access not a public figure).




terests of society and the individual at that particular point in history.
This is evidenced by the changes in the alienation of affection action in
redefining "consortium" to reflect intangible interests rather than
physical property rights, and in recognizing the right of women to bring
the action. In the law of defamation this process is demonstrated by the
development of libel, for personal and political purposes, in response to
the development of the printed word.
Both actions continued their common law development until they
were abrogated in the twentieth century. The suit for alienation of af-
fection has been legislatively eliminated or altered in a majority of
states."4 The defamation action had been judicially restricted to the
point of near ineffectiveness by the Supreme Court in the ten years
prior to 1974.2"5
While many historical developments are similar, the primary
similarities between these two actions are their elements and, more
specifically, the injury in each which is imposed upon the plaintiff. In a
true case of defamation, the defendant has published a defamatory
remark about the plaintiff. The publication has influenced a third per-
son's thought process and has injured the plaintiff by the loss of esteem
or reputation in which he is held by that third person. In the alienation
of affection action, the defendant has committed some act which has in-
fluenced a third person who happens to be the plaintiff's spouse. This in-
fluential act, whether verbal or physical, has injured the plaintiff in that
he or she is no longer held in as high regard by the spouse than he or
she had been prior to the defendant's act.
Of course it may be said that a spouse, so influenced by the defendant,
can still maintain the same degree of respect and esteem for the plain-
tiff as before the act. This is, however, inconsistent with the facts of
most alienation of affection situations. It can not realistically be said
that when such an act takes place, absolutely nothing has been changed
in the spouse's attitude towards the plaintiff and the marriage; some
change in the spouse's opinion must occur.
Further, the injury to the plaintiff may extend to society in general.
The effect of losing one's spouse under alienation of affection cir-
cumstances could also affect the opinions other individuals have with
regard to the plaintiff. Thus when a "good" marriage is destroyed by
the acts of outside individuals, the inability to preserve the marital rela-
tionship may reflect unfavorably on the plaintiff in the eyes of other in-
dividuals.
The same may be said of the circumstances surrounding the defama-
tion action. There must be some effect on the person to whom a
defamatory falsehood is published. Even if such a false remark is
... See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
"Ih See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
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dismissed for what it is, the remark has been heard, or seen and pro-
cessed in the mind of some third person. Although the degree of harm
may be slight, it will nevertheless be present.
Both actions are alike in that they are relational torts.'78 This species
of tort recognizes the injury done to one individual's relationship with
another,"'7 and the "gist" of the harm is the interference with the per-
sonal relationship of the plaintiff with a third person. Alienation of af-
fection and defamation share this common harm because, in both situa-
tions, the defendant has interfered with the plaintiffs relationship with
a third person by causing some loss of an intangible part of an interper-
sonal relationship.
7 8
The difference between the two actions consists of the kind of rela-
tion interfered with. The defamatory falsehood interferes with non-
familial relationships, while alienation of affection actions deal solely
with the relationship between spouses. " 9 A second difference between
the actions is that one developed out of property law, while the other
was strictly a personal tort. As has been noted, the alienation of affec-
tion action grew out of the husband's feudal property right in his
spouse. 0 Defamation, on the other hand, was always more akin to a per-
sonal injury action.' These differences, however slight, were to greatly
affect the futures of these two actions and may explain their differing
positions today. However, the question of whether these differences
should have had such effect remains to be answered.
V. SUPERFICIAL ARGUMENTS AND UNDERLYING REASONS
FOR DECLINE OF ALIENATION ACTIONS
The present rationale behind abrogation of the action for alienation of
affection is basically the same as that stated during the initial move-
ment towards abolishment of the action during the 1930's.182 The three
primary arguments consist of abuse of the action, the unstable marriage
and excessive damages.
In response to those fearing abuse of the action leading to increased
incidents of extortion and blackmail, it can only be said that there is no
178 A relational tort is one which deals with an injury to a relational interest,
that is, relations between one individual and another. See Green, Relational In-
terests, 31 ILL. L. REv. 35 (1936).
177 Id.
178 In defamation cases, this consists of esteem and reputation. In alienation of
affection the loss consists of esteem, love, affection, etc. Id.
171 See generally Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St. 2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 338 (1964); Duf-
fies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890).
"' See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
"' See generally notes 65-90 supra and accompanying text.




real evidence of such abuse commonly occurring.183 Further, procedural
and judicial discretion would appear to be sufficient safeguards against
such abuse. "Fear of abuse" could be argued when considering legal
treatment of any action. The purpose of the judicial system is to ferret
out those actions which are abusive and brought in bad faith, in order to
protect the rights of those who, in good faith, have been injured.18
The second argument often made is that if the marriage is so easily
shaken it is because it is shaky to begin with. 18 5 This argument fails to
take into account the existence of a "good" marriage which may still be
susceptible to the bad influences of third parties.8 " Such an argument
would appear to exemplify a lack of clear understanding of the possible
application of the action. Not every alienation of affection involves one
spouse's participation in sexual relations with a defendant. In fact, a ma-
jority of cases involve one spouse's immediate family member interfer-
ing with and harrasing the spouse's marriage. 87 For example, of the
forty-one alienation of affection actions reaching the Supreme Court of
Iowa prior to May 1978, more than half involved immediate family
members of a spouse without any allegation of extramarital sexual ac-
tivity .188
The final argument made against maintaining or reinstating the ac-
tion is that the action has a tendency to inflame the passions of jurors,
leading to excessive damages. 89 However, the same general problem has
1 See Feisinger, supra note 41, at 1008-09.
1 See Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1942), where the court stated
that if alienation of affection actions were to be denied for the possibility of the
action being brought in bad faith, every action would be precluded, "for in every
kind of litigation some suits are brought in bad faith; the very purpose of courts
is to defeat unjust prosecutions and to secure the rights of parties in just pro-
secutions .... " Id. at 729. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 887-88.
11 See Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional In-
terference with the Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 426, 431 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Intentional Interference].
16 Id. Contra, H. CLARK, supra note 3, who states that "a marriage is not
broken up by outsiders it if is solidly based on the affections of the parties." Id. at
266.
' See Glatstein v. Grund, 243 Iowa 541, 51 N.W.2d 162 (1952); Brown v.
Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 61 N.W.2d 656 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954);
Wallace v. Wallace, 83 Mont. 492, 279 P. 374 (1929); Achione v. Achione, 376 Pa.
36, 101 A.2d 642 (1954); Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 A. 758 (1925);
Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d 132 (1966); W. PROSSER, supra note 9,
at 876; Brown, supra note 20, at 482.
'" Bearbower v. Merry, 216 N.W.2d 128, 132-33 (Iowa 1978). The Court stated
that of the forty-one actions brought before them, twenty-two involved members
of a spouse's immediate family, and seventeen of these were brought by the wife
against one or both of her in-laws. Id. "Mother-in-law" cases are common in the
annals of alienation of affection actions. See cases cited in note 187 supra.
I" E.g., Cleavenger v. Castle, 255 Mich. 66, 237 N.W. 542 (1931) ($450,000);
Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 A. 758 (1925) ($465,000).
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been met in the defamation action.'9' Judicial discretion has, again, been
an effective tool to combat this problem when necessary. 9 1
The very basis of this argument is also questionable. The notion that
jurors' passions become inflamed in these instances is apparently based
on the same misconceptions about the action which developed from the
sensational newspaper stories of the 1930's.' 9 Even if these reports
were accurate, it is doubtful that such a claim could legitimately be
made today. Today's juror is more sophisticated than the juror of fifty
years ago. He has been exposed, primarily through electronic media, to
a variety of alienation of affection circumstances. By being exposed to
more of these situations, today's juror is more accustomed to seeing
these circumstances in daily life. It is less likely that his or her "pas-
sions" will become inflamed when presented with an alienation of affec-
tion action.
As has been demonstrated, none of these superficial arguments with-
stand rational thought. If the action is considered clearly and in the pro-
per perspective, without the influence of the nonlegal community, it is
apparent that the action represents a genuine interest in protecting the
individual from interference in an interpersonal relationship. What then
are the underlying causes of the action's decline?
A. Misunderstanding the Action
The action itself has been misinterpreted in two ways which have led
to its decline. When abolishment of the action was called for during the
1930's, one of the major concerns voiced was that the action was based
on a property right.'93 As such, it was argued that any action which
treated newly emancipated women as chattel could not exist in modern
society. 94
While it is true that the action originally was based on the premise
that the wife was the husband's chattel,'95 by the 1930's this had clearly
been changed.' With the recognition that damage was caused by the
loss of marriage intangibles,'97 and that a wife had an interest in her hus-
19 E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) ($750,000); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
($460,000 and $500,000 respectively); New York Times v. Sullivan, 329 U.S. 254
(1964) ($500,000).
"'. Cleavenger v. Castle, 255 Mich. 66, 237 N.W. 542 (1931) (jury verdict of
$450,000 reduced to $150,000).
912 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
19 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
194 Id.
95 See notes 20-28 supra and accompanying text.
" See generally notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.




band's consortium, 98 the action no longer was one for (or based on) prop-
erty rights. The action had become a personal injury tort, much like
defamation.'99
Secondly, only a small minority of the alienation of affection actions
involved extramarital sexual escapades,"' abuse of the action,"' or ex-
cessive damages. 2 There are indications that a majority of cases in-
volved a spouse's immediate family members interfering with the mar-
riage.0 Abuse of the action and potential excessive damages have been
judicially controlled.0 '4
Thus, misunderstanding the basic nature of the action and its
historical development would appear to be the true reason for abroga-
tion of the action."0 Legislators, desiring to woo the voting public, had
chosen to rely on the misrepresentation of sensational journalism rather
than on the true legal nature of the action 0 Because of this, state after
state has acted, with a snowballing effect, to do away with the action
based on the uninformed sensational representations of the 1930's."7
B. Misunderstanding "Consortium"
Another underlying reason for the abrogation of the action was, and
is, the misunderstanding of the term "consortium." As noted, consor-
tium was originally a property right vested in the husband. Since the
case of Heermance v. James,"6 however, the property aspects of "con-
sortium" have been done away with. 9
Twentieth century social policy should recognize that the consortium
of present day marriage and family relations consists of more than the
physical presence of a servant or chattel. Consortium consists of in-
tangibles such as love, affection and esteem. Such intangibles make a
successful marriage relationship possible."
'98 See notes 42-50 supra and accompanying text.
19 See notes 180-81 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 187-88 supra and accompanying text.
201 See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
o See notes 187-88 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 184, 190-91 supra and accompanying text.
' Dean Prosser also lumps together the action for alienation of affection and
criminal conversation. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 876.
See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. 1866). For a discussion of the case and its application to
the consortium definition, see notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
One possible explanation for the nonrealization of the change in the consor-
tium character may be that because each state had its own definition of consor-
tium, the Heermance definition was not acted on by other jurisdictions.
210 See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text. Recently, the term "consor-
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These consortium rights are not the same property rights of medieval
times. They are intangible rights which should be freely available to
both parties in a marriage. The diminution of any of these intangibles
should be by choice of the spouse rather than the choice of some third
party.
C. Decline of the Family
A possible third reason for the decline of the alienation of affection ac-
tion is the changing social view of the family relationship. The rationale
for this is that the values which today's society places on the marriage
institution are not the same as those of earlier times."' It could be
argued that today's morals permit extramarital sexual activity and that,
therefore, the action is outdated. This view would appear to run con-
trary to an increasing divorce rate. If society permits extramarital sex-
ual relations, why would anyone get divorced for adultery?
The "permissible extramarital affair" argument would appear to be a
logical argument for the abolition of criminal conversation, but not for
the abolition of alienation of affection. Criminal conversation deals solely
with the exclusive right of one spouse to sexual relations with the other
spouse.2 This action has been noted to be flawed for the very reason
presented above. Evidently the argument has been directed towards
the wrong action." 3
The alienation of affection action does not require a showing of
adultery in order to be maintained. The interests involved in the aliena-
tion of affection action and the criminal conversation action are dif-
ferent. The former involves the intangible injury to love and affection,
while the latter involves injury for loss of exclusive sexual rights. The
latter involves a loss of a more tangible nature akin to the early prop-
erty right for which medieval actions for marital interference were
maintained.
Further, the defendant in the alienation of affection action has a
number of defenses available to him, including connivance, ignorance of
marriage and privilege."4 These defenses take into account the actions
tium" has been defined as company, cooperation, affection and aid, in addition to
conjugal fellowship. See Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 1978).
See also Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St. 2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 338 (1964) (dissenting opin-
ion).
211 Consider the descriptions of various modern relationships contained in
Flaherty, Property Rights on Termination of Alternative Life Styles: Cohabita-
tion, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Flaherty].
212 Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, at 134 (Iowa 1978).
"3 See note 205 supra.
214 Intentional Interference, supra note 185, at 429. In Fuller v. Robinson, 130
S.W.343 (Mo. 1910), the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:
Yet, if you shall further believe from the evidence that plaintiff permit-




of those who compromise an unsuspecting potential defendant. For ex-
ample, a stranger who was tricked into an alienation action, or a family
member interfering in good faith, would both have valid defenses. Fur-
ther, the action requires purposeful interference with the marriage; if
the defendant lacks personal knowledge that the marriage exists, he or
she cannot be held liable. 15
The traditions of marriage and the family institution are still of great
importance in today's society. While there may be a variety of cohabita-
tion plans which are employed as a substitute for traditional marriage,2
traditional marriages continue to exist. When one interferes with a
traditional marriage, with the intent to disrupt that relationship, a basic
civil right is being attacked. The right to maintain the family and to
self-determination as to the future of the marital relationship are rights
which married individuals reserve to themselves. The Supreme Court of
the United States has said that marriage is a basic civil right and "fun-
conduct from the defendant to his wife or from his wife to the defendant,
then your verdict must be for the defendant, notwithstanding you may
believe from the evidence that such attentions and conduct finally
resulted in alienating the affections of the plaintiffs wife from him and
in her separation from him. Fifth. That if she had any affection for plain-
tiff and the same was alienated by the conduct and actions of plaintiff
himself towards her, or by his neglect of her, or from any cause
whatever, other than the attentions, conduct, or influence of defendant,
with the wrongful and willfull purpose and intent of alienating her affec-
tions from her husband, or inducing her to separate or remain away
from him, then your verdict will be for the defendant.
Id. at 353. In Madison v. Neuburger, 130 Misc. 650, 224 N.Y.S. 461 (1927), it was
noted that "in an action for alienation of affections, plaintiff has the burden of
proving scienter on the part of the defendant as to the relationship she was
breaking up." 130 Misc. at 654, 224 N.Y.S. at 463. Finally, in Carrieri v. Bush, 69
Wash.2d 536, 419 P.2d 132 (1966), the court explained the defense of privilege as
follows:
It is within the context of the defense of jurisdiction and excuse that a
parent, near relative or one standing in a professional or semiprofes-
sional relationship to a marital partner may be clothed with a qualified
privilege to reasonably and in good faith intervene in the domestic af-
fairs of a married couple. This privilege, however, where it appears, may
be overcome by evidence that the interference in the marital affairs was
prompted by malice or ill will; accompanied by falsehoods; implemented
by threats; utilized recklessly; or motivated by an unlawful, immoral or
improper purpose.
419 P.2d at 136-37 (citations omitted). But the court also gave the following warn-
ing: "An intermeddling stranger, on the other hand, can claim no privilege to in-
vade the domestic circle. He intervenes at his peril, and bears the burden of
otherwise justifying or excusing his action." Id. at 137.
215 See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 877-78; Intentional Interference, supra
note 185. Even mere negligence which results in alienation of affection is not ac-
tionable: The defendant's act must be for the purpose of alienating affections. See
W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 877-78.
21 See Flaherty, supra note 211.
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damental to our very existence and survival." 1 ' The marriage relation-
ship is of such importance that it has been stated to be one that is pro-
tected under the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.18 The right to privacy
in the marriage relationship should not be interfered with, and the op-
portunity to redress such interference should not be abridged.
VI. SUGGESTIONS
The arguments presented in favor of abolishing the action for aliena-
tion of affection and the underlying cause for this trend do not appear to
be sufficiently justified in light of careful analysis. It is clear that in this
area, just as in defamation law, there is a real injury for which an action
should lie." 9 Inequities may exist in the action. These should not,
however, be cause to "throw out the baby with the bath water."" °
Just as the United States Supreme Court has struck a balance be-
tween the conflicting social and individual interests of protecting in-
terpersonal relations harmed by defamatory statements and maintain-
ing the free exchange of ideas, a balance should be struck in the law of
alienation of affection. Social and individual interests are represented
by prohibiting interference with the marital relationship. At the same
time this interest must be balanced with the consideration that an in-
dividual in a marital relationship has the freedom to choose to voluntar-
ily alienate his or her own affections, thereby imputing no guilt to a
third person. This balance would more accurately reflect the needs of
society in protecting these interests.
Legislative action on this matter has been unacceptable. Reliance on
misinformation and misunderstanding of the nature of the action and
the interests it protects has led a majority of legislatures to choose the
easy way out of the legal decision-making process.2" Political considera-
tions, having played a part in these decisions, suggest that perhaps the
process should be turned over to the judiciary. Judicial activity in the
similar relational tort action of defamation would indicate that the
judiciary is better qualified to apply this process.
Some uniformity in the application of the law and the definition of
consortium is needed. Lack of uniformity among the states in applying
this law was one element which led to the initial failure of the action fifty
years ago. 2 Uniformity, however, may be impossible to achieve in the
21 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
218 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
219 See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 887-88.
See Intentional Interference, supra note 185, at 430.
21 See notes 51-60 supra and accompanying text.




near future if the need is left for a slow and heavily-burdened judicial
system.
Recognizing that it may be some time before this area of the law
could reach the United States Supreme Court for definitive guidelines,223
it is suggested that the action be initially turned over to a committee of
practitioners and scholars to develop and present a set of uniform
guidelines in this matter to the various states for adoption. Such
guidelines should include, for example, a definition of consortium as con-
sisting of intangibles (love and affection), and uniform jury instructions
as to the necessity of proving actual intent to disrupt the marriage. The
guidelines also could require involuntary participation of the alienated
spouse, prior to any recovery.224
A balancing effect, rather than following one extreme or the other,
would be attained. This would protect the rights of all individuals in-
volved in this action which, in turn, would serve the best interests of
society and the judicial decision-making process. Questions which should
then arise at trial include who initiated the disruptive act and, if in-
itiated by the third person, whether he was initially aware of the mar-
riage. Such questions of fact are to be answered by the judicial process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Total abolition of the action for alienation of affection has clearly been
the easy way out of a legal dilemma. This way has been chosen by a
number of legislatures based on misrepresentation of the action in
newspaper accounts as well as their own misconceptions of the very
nature of the action. The interests which the action serves are those of
the individual, the marriage and society as a whole. Total abolition
would only remove the protections afforded to those interests by the ac-
tion.
The better route is to modify the action by balancing the interests in-
volved. In this manner, protections are left intact for married in-
dividuals and new protections are created for the potential defendant.
The approach employed by the United States Supreme Court in the
area of defamation, also a relational tort, demonstrates the effectiveness
of the balancing of these interests when making new law. Because of the
' Consider the length of time the action of defamation took to reach the
Supreme Court in order to establish uniform guidelines. See notes 91-114 supra
and accompanying text.
" A degree of negligence was recognized at common law as being a bar to
bringing the action. See note 215 supra and accompanying text. However, this
degree did not extend to the defendant who was approached by a spouse whose
affections had been voluntarily alienated prior to making the approach. The
defendant may not have been the cause of the alienation but still would have
been held liable.
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need for reexamination of the action, the need for balancing the in-
terests involved and uniformity among the laws of the states is essential
to the existence of the action, it is urged that such steps be immediately
taken by those actually involved in this area of the law. Such treatment
of the law of alienation of affection would better serve both society and
the individuals who are legitimately injured in alienation cases.
RICHARD G. ZEIGER
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